The Conflict Between Hedonism and Altruism
There is a conflict between the two assumptions of the humanist value theory, hedonism and altruism.
Hedonism situates value in the feelings of pain and pleasure. Feelings are subjective. They are tied to a perspective. They only exist (as feelings) for the subject who experiences them. Thus, if value consists of feelings, then value is subject-dependent. My feelings are not your feelings, and thus my value is not your value.
But the altruism principle says that your value is, or should be, my value. Given the assumption of hedonism, altruism implies that your feelings have value to me, even though I don’t feel them. In that case, it can’t be the feeling that makes them valuable to me.
That’s the conflict. Altruism and hedonism have inconsistent views of value. Hedonistic value is subject-dependent. Altruistic moral value is subject-independent.
Some people claim that hedonism is self-evident, based on an appeal to experience. In their view, we know that pain is bad because it feels bad, and we know that pleasure is good because it feels good. This is really a definition of bad and good, not an empirical argument. Regardless, it conflicts with altruism, because I don’t feel the pain or pleasure of others. Their pain doesn’t feel bad to me, and their pleasure doesn’t feel good to me. If I know that pain is bad and pleasure is good from direct experience, then I also know that the pain of others is not bad and the pleasure of others is not good.
If hedonism is self-evident, then so is selfishness.
We can define different types of altruism for different types of utility: energetic, biological and psychological. Energetic altruism is giving resources/labor to others. Biological altruism is helping others to reproduce at some cost to your own reproductive fitness. Psychological altruism is sacrificing value for the sake of others.
Psychological altruism is impossible. Voluntary action is doing what you want, or in other words, acting toward what you value. You can’t voluntarily do something unless you value doing it. So, you are always acting toward what you value.
By definition, altruism is bad for you. The cost exceeds the benefit. Given that altruism has negative value to you, there is no reason to be altruistic. You can be energetically or biologically altruistic, but only for psychologically selfish reasons.
For example, I am energetically altruistic toward my children, because I value their safety, health and comfort. That energetic altruism is biologically and psychologically selfish.
The hedonism and altruism assumptions are not compatible. If you accept the hedonism assumption, then the happiness of others would only have value to you if it was instrumental to your happiness.
There is an important distinction between personal and moral value. Personal value defines good and bad from a subjective, individual perspective. Moral value defines good and bad from an objective, cosmic perspective. What is good for me, personally, is not necessarily morally good.
Morality assumes that the individual contains two different, conflicting value-perspectives: personal and moral. He makes personal value judgments and moral value judgments. He is motivated toward both personal and moral good. Moral value is both personal and cosmic, subjective and objective.
This makes no sense at all. Morality is incoherent.
Most of the time, what people view as moral value is actually social value, which is imposed on the individual by incentives. Shared values emerge culturally, and we collectively impose them on ourselves. There are no moral values or imperatives. There are social values and imperatives, which are imposed on individuals by society.
See What is Morality?.
The humanist value theory is incoherent. More generally, morality is incoherent.